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1 INTRODUCTION 
For the past 20 years, Business Process Management (BPM) [29] and related technologies such as Business 
Rules [10, 52] and Robotic Process Automation [36] have streamlined processes and operational decision-
making in large enterprises, transforming work organization. These tools organize information circuits, from 
input events such as an order or a hiring request, through chains of stakeholders involved in various parts of 
the process, to reach some outcome. In a nutshell, a BPM system allows programming an enterprise like one 
would a robot. For some, these tools tend to rigidify the flow of information in a company and create a loss of 
context. However, there is ample evidence they provide numerous advantages: monitoring the flows of 
information, rearchitecting processes more easily, and providing much needed transparency and reliability to 
large and complex business entities. These technologies are used for instance in hiring processes, financial 
transactions oversight, procurement, business controls… 
 
Because all inputs and decisions are stored, recent improvements involve applying machine learning 
techniques on past inputs and outcomes, to automate decision processes or to assist decision makers by 
providing suggestions on the likely outcome of each decision, assuming similar causes produce similar effects 
[39,51]. This technology ought to be largely beneficial, reinforcing the consistency of decisions and improving 
productivity, enabling “extended cognition”, or “active externalism” as described by Chalmers [14]. Now, 
augmenting decision processes is not without risks. There is a large institutional community focusing on the 
area of AI Ethics, that stresses the requirements of fairness, transparency, explainabilty, accountability [28]… 
In particular, the prevention of algorithmic biases is a major concern [42], which needs to be addressed by 
technology [6], best practices [3] and regulations [37]. There is less institutional visibility on the changes to work 
practices and human decision-making these tools introduce. Cognitive biases induced by decision support 
systems are largely studied, identifying patterns such as automation and complacency biases [5] or, on the 
contrary, algorithm aversion [9] and decision fatigue [27, 4] when higher productivity is expected. There is less 
work directly applicable to the context of business decision-making, in particular in our present situation, where 
decision aids can be provided as a generic, system-level feature, regardless of their relevance for the task being 
performed by the human agent. 
 
To ensure this type of assistance can be safely and profitably incorporated in business decision support systems, 
we first narrow down the type of tasks we are interested in augmenting, and the type of aids we wish to evaluate. 
Then, we review the literature to guide our designs. We present an empirical study of a simple decision task, 
which enables measuring the performance improvements augmented decision-making may provide, but also 
quantify various biases reducing the rationality of the subjects. We propose the definition of a resistance metric, 
that quantifies the ability of the human to retain their rationality. In a follow-up study, we assess the impact of 5 
design choices to reduce those biases and increase resistance. Finally, we propose a methodology to 
incorporate bias measurement and compensation in business decision support systems, to ensure they provide 
their expected benefits with minimal inconvenience.  
2 AUGMENTED BUSINESS DECISION MAKING 
A business process is modeled in a flowchart (Figure 1). In this model, decision steps take as input some 
information, leverage external information, such as regulations or resource constraints, presumably only known 
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to the decision maker, to advance the process through a predetermined set of possible outcomes. The type of 
decision tasks we investigate are constrained, leave little room for creative solutions (short of changing the 
process on the fly!) and presumably rely on a combination of explicit rules and heuristics. 
 
When the decision logic can be formally expressed, Business Rules Management Systems (BRMS) [52] can 
automate the decisions, deterministically. When sufficiently robust heuristics are available, scoring methods or 
more sophisticated algorithms may also automate the decision, with an escalation process to handle exceptions. 
Finally, as in the hiring example, opening a new position in a specific team involves complex tradeoffs, which, 
we assume, involve so many factors that full automation is for now out of question. In these cases, a decision 
aid fed with previous decisions and possibly external data sources, such as revenue targets for the team and 
hiring requests in other teams, may provide information that can be useful to the general manager who decides 
to open a position.  
 
 
Figure 1: simplified hiring process represented as a workflow diagram. Horizontal bands represent the person or service 
involved in the process, rectangles depict tasks (which can be processes themselves), diamonds represent decision steps, 
which may be fully automated, or carried by humans, with or without decision aids.  
More formally, we are interested in measuring, and possibly improve, the effects the presentation of decision 
aids may have in the following circumstances: 
- Some information regarding a case is available and is assumed to be reliable. 
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- A choice, among a predefined set of alternatives, must be made to handle this case. 
- The choice is partly constrained by some explicit constraints (regulations, resource limitations…) 
- Some contextual information, exact or probabilistic, explicit or intuitive, is available to the decision 
maker (e.g. guidelines & priorities regarding the business context). Those allow the decision maker 
to form an internal decision model. 
- Other information may be known only by the system, such as a history of similar cases.  
- There is a best possible choice, but it may not be knowable in advance, if ever, for a given case. 
- It is possible to provide, a posteriori, exact or approximate measures of which choices tend to perform 
better for which types of cases. These measures can be used to create a computable decision model. 
 
There are numerous business situations that match this description, ranging from the mundane, such as a 
purchase decision, to more serious decisions such as hiring someone, granting a loan or selecting the winner 
of a bid, finally to morally heavy situations like deciding of a prison sentence [49]. Still, much decision-making 
activity, such as medical diagnostic or investment decisions, allow more creativity in choice-making and falls 
outside the scope of our work. What matters in our circumstances is that no algorithm may deliver a choice with 
100% accuracy. An algorithm may be better than humans in general, but there is no substitute for human 
judgment and liability, when it is not possible, even a posteriori, to know if a a particular decision was the right 
one or not. 
 
A variety of decision aids can be automatically provided in this context, which we categorize as follows, inspired 
from Miller’s description of explanations [41]: 
- Displaying more prominently attributes deemed most important in the decision (inputs) 
- Scoring of the possible choices (computed by deterministic rules, deduction) 
- Comparable cases and their outcomes (Nearest neighbors, induction) 
- Decision tree classifier (such as random forests) output, its degree of confidence for the case, and 
the branch taken to provide the result (probabilistic deduction). 
- Counterfactuals (if this attribute had this value, then the decision would be X with high certainty, 
abduction). 
While there may be more types of decision aids, these cover the use cases we have reviewed in the literature 
that can be implemented generically (i.e. without specific tuning for the decision task, for instance creating a 
custom visualization for the decision step or for a given user). Finally, the presentation of these decision aids 
may influence their usage. They may be provided as plain recommendations, inciting the user to follow them, 
or available only on request, after a delay, or even after the decision has been made, as a verification step. 
 
Our goal is to assess if decision aids improve the decision-making process, moving it towards a definition of 
rational decision-making suitable to our context.  For now, we focus on performance metrics: 
- Can we provide a methodology to measure decision-making performance in our contexts of use? 
- Can the combination of human and algorithmic aids outperform both the human and the algorithm taken 
alone? How can we reach this stage of human-machine “collaboration”? 
- Machine learning biases are a major concern. Even if this human-machine collaboration is an 
improvement, it seems inevitable that underlying algorithmic biases may taint decisions. Various 
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cognitive biases may interfere. Can we identify and separate those to design correction strategies 
targeted at each of them? 
- Can we define a measure of resistance, namely the ability for a human and an interface to reduce 
induced biases? 
 
To address those questions, we carry an experimental study on a simple decision task meeting our 
requirements; we propose means to generalize this study in our contexts of interest, through the definition of 
some metrics. But before, we must acknowledge that there is a large body of literature addressing similar issues, 
which has guided our research.  
3 RELATED WORK 
3.1 Decision Theory 
Understanding decision-making is a full research area in psychology. For a start, there are several positions 
regarding the notion of “correct” decision. For Rational Decision Theory, a rational choice maximizes an 
expected utility function [26, p.237]. Non rational theories [23] consider effects such as risk aversion or 
naturalistic viewpoints. Ultimately, these approaches can be reconciled when assumptions are clearly stated 
[30]. We take mostly a Rational Decision Theory standpoint, because we believe simple hypotheses are 
acceptable in our context. We also assume good will: the decision maker and the decision stakeholders (the 
company) share the same utility. Under stress, pressure, or poor motivation, we may find a divergence, which 
leads to a complacency bias or decision fatigue [4]. Within decision theory, our work falls into the area of judge-
advisor systems [8]. Although much of the literature in this area is focused on human advisors, we retain the 
importance of advice presentation on the decision outcomes [38]. 
 
A major lesson of Decision Theory is that performance varies between individuals: experts and novices 
approach problems differently, and personality traits can have a strong influence [48]. Classical cognitive biases 
such as the order effect can be significant [47]. Finally, the availability of more information does not necessarily 
lead to better decision-making [17]. For fast and frugal or other recent approaches [25, 23], human decision 
making does not rely so much on risk - when the decision rules and probabilities of outcomes are well modeled 
- than on uncertainty - where the indecisiveness is not just a consequence of unknowns quantities, but also of 
unknows on the suitability of the decision process itself -. Hence, making a decision heuristically, based on 
limited information, may yield better results than paying close attention to possibly irrelevant details. Burton [9] 
convincingly defends that, by design, algorithmic decision aids operate under models of risk, while humans 
need to consider the uncertainties of a situation. Consciously leveraging this difference may provide the means 
to make the best of human and algorithm complementarity. 
3.2 Decision Support Systems 
Algorithmic decision aids have existed for a long time, in slightly different contexts.  
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3.2.1 Semi-automation/process control 
Our early focus was on measuring, and possibly reducing, authority and complacency biases, which we felt 
should occur in our context. A large portion of the literature on these biases focuses on tasks that involve less 
dedicated attention and analysis than business decision. For instance, Parasuraman [44] finds attentional 
deficits at the onset of complacency biases. Bahner [5] identify this bias in process control tasks that involve 
verification rather than true decision making. Automation bias is clearly related to complacency bias. It can also 
result from attention deficits, which are even more prevalent in assisted driving tasks [21]. Alexander [2] finds a 
conformity bias: use by others increases trust in an algorithm. Finally, Gomboley [24], Yetgin [54] and Alberdi 
[1] describe a major cause of biases: when the algorithm outperforms the human most of the time, motivation 
necessarily dwindles. Conversely, Onnash [43] provides some evidence that decision aids lose all usefulness 
when they provide less than 70% accuracy, which indicates that providing those in generic business processes 
requires some prior assessment of relevance. 
3.2.2 Recommender Systems  
Recommender systems are algorithmic decision aids, but the tasks they support does not meet our focus: they 
don’t help making a choice among predetermined outcomes, and decision quality is elusive: we often have to 
assimilate decision performance with user satisfaction [32]. Several types of cognitive biases can interfere, such 
as exposure bias [31]. Interestingly, recent literature in decision theory for recommender systems focuses on 
algorithm aversion, the opposite of complacency/authority biases: subjects avoid following recommendations, 
even when the algorithms perform better than humans [9]. The literature stresses the need to provide 
explanations [53, 46], especially for expert users [33]. We also notice that trust in the system degrades when 
bad recommendations occur [45], or when the task is highly subjective [13]. These findings should apply to our 
context of use. 
3.2.3 Visual Analytics for decision making 
Visual Analytics is an entire class of algorithmic decision aids. Visualization tools are geared towards exploratory 
analysis, which involves open decisions [20], thus is not in our focus. Still, work on identifying and reducing 
cognitive biases, such as the attraction effect [18] is relevant. More significant, the identification of the numerous 
biases [19] that may be found in visual decision aids provides a useful guiding framework. 
3.3 Impact of algorithmic decision aids on work practices, and ethical considerations 
3.3.1 Medical decision support 
Medical decision support systems include decision aids and are extensively studied. Once again, they do not 
enter our scope, as the type of decision aids they provide are highly customized for specific purposes, and a 
medical decision can hardly qualify as a choice among predetermined possible outcomes. They support critical 
decisions, which explains why decision aids may be met with suspicion and some level of algorithm aversion 
[11]. Even in successful propositions [12], suspicion may not arise from the tool itself, but from the way it 
transforms work practices, perhaps for the better, but in directions which open avenues for high uncertainty [15]. 
At this point, addressing both algorithmic and cognitive biases in decision aids reaches beyond the scientific 
undertaking, into the realm of professional ethics. Determining the role of algorithmic decision aids requires a 
rigorous assessment of their power and their limitations in benefiting society. 
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3.3.2 From scientific to ethical considerations 
Health professions are not the only industry questioning the impact of decision aids on work practices. Morris 
[50] devotes a whole chapter on cognitive biases in decision-making for accounting, and how overcoming those 
biases is an ethical issue. Legal and administrative professions raise similar concerns [16], including how proper 
explanations improve the perception of legal decisions [7]. Decision automation also produces surprising 
adaptive behaviors to circumvent the loss of control associated with algorithm-driven activities. For instance, 
[40] shows that human players learn to control computer players in computer games. Kyung Lee [35] describes 
how Uber drivers use collaboration to understand and regain some level of control over the dispatch algorithms. 
One of the possible shortcomings of algorithm-driven decision making (and decision aids) is the potential to 
induce unwanted behaviors by reverse engineering the decision aids’ logic: the decision maker becomes 
‘controlled’ by the subjects impacted by those decisions. 
To address these concerns, expert groups and regulatory bodies provide guidelines [28, 3] to design trustworthy 
decision support systems. But in our context, we need more than design guidelines and regulations. We need 
metrics, and possibly a partially automated method to ensure those metrics stay within safe boundaries in the 
variety of contexts were algorithmic decision aids will be generically embedded in business decision support 
systems.  As a first step towards this ambitious goal, we have conducted an empirical study on a simple task to 
guide the design of such metrics in the hope of generalizing them to real-world tasks. 
4 STUDY DESIGN 
Our study relies on a simple decision task: some information describing a case, a choice to be made among 
predefined possible outcomes, a right choice that depends on some rules and heuristics presumed known to 
the user (with an acceptable degree of variability). We test a single decision aid, presented as a 
recommendation from a generic classifier, under a variety of presentation modes. Sometimes the recommender 
will be misleading. We want to measure the success rate of the subjects, the impact of “wrong” 
recommendations – defining a notion of resistance - as well as other measures such as decision fatigue or time 
taken to reach a decision. The deviation from rationality is attributed to an authority or complacency bias, which 
are indistinguishable in our case. Both denote that the subject choses to follow the recommender over their own 
reasoning or intuition, in the first case because of a lack of motivation, in the second because they trust the 
algorithm more than themselves. Once we have obtained measures for a control condition (without decision 
aids), we provide decision aids with various presentations and observe the performance variations. 
4.1 Choice of a decision task to evaluate 
Resorting to a real-world task to define and assess our metrics is difficult: it requires extensive domain 
knowledge, and access to many expert users. Instead, we propose a simple decision task, for which a large 
population can create their own internal decision model easily. We leverage the well-known Titanic dataset1, a 
database of passengers on the Titanic ship that sunk in 1912. This dataset is widely used to teach classification 
algorithms, because it exhibits some obvious patterns: most women in 1st and 2nd class survived, while most 
men in 3rd and 2nd class died, and other attributes such as number of relatives on board have a significant but 
 
1 https://www.kaggle.com/c/titanic 
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lesser influence on the fate of each passenger. Simple machine learning classifiers, as well as humans after a 
short study of the data, exhibit success rates of 70-80% in guessing correctly if a passenger survived or not.  
 
The decision task consists in deciding if a given passenger has survived or died. The task is repeated 20 times. 
To create an incentive, the presentation is somewhat gamified: subjects are enticed to maximize their score of 
correct guesses. Unbeknown to the subjects, the passengers presented all follow the expected distribution of 
survivors: a logistics regression classifier has >70% chance of correct classification on those passengers.  
Hence, we are asking the subject to make a rational choice - maximizing their probability of scoring high -, not 
a chance guess. This means reaching a perfect score is possible and even likely. Obtaining less than 50% (less 
than random chance) is a sure sign the subject is not properly committed to the task. 
4.2 Stimulus presentation 
The experiment starts with a few demographic questions: age range, level of studies and type of studies 
(humanities, business, engineering/science or other). Then the subject is presented with the goal, as well as 
some interactive visualizations (treemap) that let them create an internal decision model. We do not present 
explicit decision rules so as not to taint subjects (Figure 2). Next, we introduce the task, indicating that the 
recommender (in the experimental condition) has about 76% success rate of guessing correctly. Then, we 
present the stimuli (Figure 3). In accordance to the stated success rate of the recommender, 5 times in the run 
of 20 trials, the recommendation is wrong: it says “survived” when the subject has died or vice-versa. 
 
Figure 2: interactive visualization (treemap), helping the user form an internal decision model of who predominantly survived 
on the Titanic: Females from 1st and 2nd class, and who tended to die: males of 2nd and 3rd class. 
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Figure 3: Stimuli in the experimental condition: passenger data, followed by a recommendation (dies or survives), and, on 
the right, 2 buttons “survives” and “die”. In the control condition, the recommendation panel is not shown. 
 
Finally, after 20 trials, we ask a few experience questions: estimated success rate, did they choose intuitively 
or using self-made rules (or don’t know), how many times they think the recommender provided the wrong 
answer, and a free comment box. Finally, we provide their score, and an invitation to an event that presented 
the early results. We set a cookie on their browser so they can’t repeat the experiment for a few hours, so as 
not to taint our data collection with repeated trials by the same subject. 
4.3 Second run: presentation variants 
The first run was meant to compare a control condition (no decision aid) with an experimental condition. In a 
second run, on a different population, we tested 5 different presentations: 
 
- Control: the same presentation as in the first run 
- Optional display: the recommendation is displayed only if the user requests it. 
- Forced acknowledgement: the subject is presented with the passenger data, then must click a button to 
make the recommendation appear, and only then, after a small delay, they enter their choice. 
- Reminder of 75%: instead of being only stated at the beginning, the subject is reminded that the decision 
aid has a 75% chances of success next to the recommendation. 
- 80% success rate: instead of “guessing wrong” 75% of the time (5/20), the decision aid “fails” only 4 
times out of 20. Of course, this is stated to the user, so it should not impact a rational behavior. 
 
Each subject was assigned to the same condition for all their trials. The goal of this run was to assess how 
different presentation strategies and recommender reliability affect the measures of success, authority and 
resistance (defined below) in a significant way. This would be a strong indication that our metrics can be 
generalized to other context to drive the design of augmented business decision support systems. 
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4.4 Subjects recruitment and filtering 
After a pre-run to calibrate expectations with ~20 subjects, we recruited subjects online. We did not want to use 
a survey service such as Amazon Mechanical Turk as we felt the subject’s engagement would be distorted by 
a financial reward. Instead, we presented the experiment as a “fun and useful challenge”. We announced the 
challenge on a variety of venues, starting in the company and student’s forums and slowly extending our call to 
a wider audience, such as focused reddit and facebook groups, over a 2 months span. 
 
Figure 4: attrition for the second run: incoming participants, complete tutorial, reach feedback form, end page. 
 
75% of the incoming participants completed the trials run, which we take as indicative of the motivation we had 
managed to induce from our anonymous subjects (Figure 4). A few participants (7) either failed to grasp the 
task or wanted to introduce noise and had less than 50% success (less than random choice), and we discarded 
them. In total, the first run had 231 participants and 155 usable trial runs, the second had 302 participants and 
250 usable trial runs. 
  
The demographics reached is a mix of students and educated professionals, with more of an 
engineering/science background, roughly equally distributed in the 20-55 age range (Figure 5). 
 
Figure 5: Distribution of the subjects by age range, years of study after high school, and type of study (self-reported). 
4.5 Measures 
To assess the impact of decision aid, we define a simple measurement of its effectiveness under a hypothesis 
of rationality: subjects want to maximize their success. Next, we define and measures of authority/complacency 
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biases, i.e. how subjects deviate from rationality when they are subjected to misleading recommendations from 
the decision aid. For this, we perform three tests of increasing sophistication. 
4.5.1 Decision aid effectiveness & collaboration 
The most elementary measure is the effectiveness of the decision aids: does the combination of human and 
decision aid increase performance compared to each taken separately? This is quantified as the ratio:  
 
M1 = success in the experimental condition  / max (success in the control condition, classifier success). 
 
This ratio depends on a lot of factors: 
- If a classifier clearly outperforms humans, there is little chance for this ratio to be > 1, full decision 
automation is most likely the best solution. 
- Conversely, a classifier will likely be useless when its accuracy is < 70% [43] 
- If the classifier and the humans tend to make the same type of mistakes, then there is no reason for M1 
to be above 1. In our setup, because the recommender choses to make a wrong recommendation at 
random, we may expect it to be above 1, unless some cognitive bias interferes. 
 
This measure is easy to assess, explain, and it provides a nice metric to guide augmented Business Decision 
system design. It tells however little about how decision aids influence decision-making. The first, and perhaps 
most prominent bias we wanted to assess is authority/complacency bias: does a wrong recommendation 
influences the subject to let them lose their rationality? We have used 3 tests of increasing refinement to identify 
and measure this bias. These tests may be used to identify other cognitive biases when the experimental setup 
is relevant to exhibit them. 
4.5.2 Asserting authority/complacency bias with statistical modeling 
Discrete modeling: We can model the set of identical individuals and their independent responses as a 
Bernoulli variable. Considering the variable Y.~Bern(p) such that P(Y=1) = P({decision is rational}). We do not 
observe Y, but we know the distribution of the random variable Y|{statei} where the states are: 
- state 1: without recommendations; the control group. 
- state 2: with recommendations: the treatment group. 
- state 3: with correct recommendation (part of treatment). 
- state 4: with incorrect recommendation (part of treatment). 
We denote Yi for Y|{statei}. Each variable Yi follows a distribution Bern(pi). Y1 and Y2 are independent, but Y3 
and Y4, coming from the same subjects, are not, thus they cannot be tested with the homogeneity test. We want 
to observe the effect of displaying a recommendation on the choice of the subject. If the subject’s rationality is 
unaffected by the display of recommendations, we will have hypothesis H0: p1 = p3 and p1 = p4, else we will 
have H1: p1 ≠ p3 and p1 ≠ p4.  
 
Continuous modeling: We can also consider a kernel density estimation. Given a random variable P 
representing the probability of a subject answering correctly. P(P<0.5) is the proportion of subjects with a 
success rate < 0.5. We consider pi, a realization of P as an aggregate of responses (not individual responses). 
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Our trial runs provide a finite number of values for P. We use a sample drawn from a Gaussian kernel 
approximation of the test samples. We use the vector (P1, P2, P3, P4) for the estimation for P|{statei}, while we 
have access to (P2, P3, P4). We want to know if showing a recommendation will influence the rationality of 
subjects. If we note Fi the cumulative density function of the rationality of group I, our hypotheses become: 1) 
Is the rationality impacted by the display of a good recommendation? H0: F1 = F3, H1: F1 ≠ F3 and 2) is the 
rationality impacted by the display of a good recommendation? H0: F1 = F4, H1: F1 ≠ F4. 
 
Unlike the first model this allows us to compare the means of P3 and P4 with multivariate delta method. We will 
also test the following hypothesis: H0: E[P3 ] = E[P4] and H1: E[P3 ] ≠ E[P4]. To go from discrete values of P to 
continuous values, we use a Gaussian kernel estimation of bandwidth h = 0.1.  
4.5.3 Quantifying an authority/complacency bias with an econometric model 
Statistical modeling allows us to observe an effect, but not to quantify it. Econometric models provide us this 
ability. 
 
Defining and measuring authority/complacency bias 
In the following, subjects are indexed by i, while decision number are indexed by t. Yi,t = 1{response of(I,t) is rational}.We 
compare the control group with the treatment group that received wrong recommendations:  
Xi,t = (1, 1{false recommendaition})T. A linear panel model [22] is defined as: 
 
αi corresponds to an individual effect. To estimate this model, we estimate: 
 
Noting νi,t=αi + ηi,t, we have E[νi,s νi,t] ≠ 0, but E[νi,t νi,t] = 0 because individuals are randomly assigned to the 
control and treatment groups and trials are randomly distributed. We can therefore estimate β with pooled 
OLS, which is a convergent estimator of β.  
 
The authority bias produced by a recommendation is the following quantity: 
 
In other words, it is the probability that a subject who sees a wrong recommendation will make a non-rational 
decision, considering he would have made a rational decision had he not seen this recommendation. 
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Defining and measuring resistance 
The resistance of a subject is his or her ability to overcome a wrong recommendation and stay rational, 
knowing he or she would have succeeded without a recommendation. Using the same econometric model, 
but on the subjects who received a wrong recommendation, we define Xi,t: 
 
The ability of subjects to abstract themselves from the wrong recommendation is defined as: 
 
It is the probability that the subject makes a rational decision when given a bad recommendation, knowing 
that if the recommendation had been correct, he would have made a rational choice. 
 
5 RESULTS 
5.1.1 Decision aid effectiveness 
The first run shows a significant collaboration effect: subjects in the control condition obtain a score of 72.3%, 
while subject in the experimental condition (with decision aid) have a 76% success rate, giving M1 = 1.014. 
 coefficient 95% confidence interval 
Control condition (human alone) 0.7230 [0.6948, 0.7512] 
With decision aid 0.7604 [0.7530, 0.7682] 
“Algorithm alone” 0.75 -- 
Table 1: decision aid effectiveness (first run result) 
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While this improvement may appear modest, it should be reminded that our experiment is tuned to obtain 
average scores in the realistic range of 70%-80%. This collaboration effect is most useful to compare the effects 
of decision aids presentation synthetically. Our second run shows some modest but consistent variations: 
 
 coefficient M1 
Control condition (human alone) 0.7230 1 
With decision aid (new run) 0.7651 1.020 
Optional display 0.7655 1.020 
Forced acknowledgment 0.7660 1.021 
Reminder of 75% 0.7619 1.016 
Table 2: measures of collaboration for various presentation modes of the recommender 
Finally, in the condition where the recommender has a 80% success rate, we have a coefficient of 0.7822 (p-
value < 10-4). Hence the collaboration effect disappears (M1 = 0.977), indicating that automatic classification 
would be better suited to the task. While we have not tested a recommenda1tion with 70% or less success rate, 
we can assume from [43] that we would find a similar negative impact on the collaboration. 
 
These measures of M1 provide allow deciding which type of presentation and decision aid to chose for a given 
task and a given effectiveness of the algorithm. However, the cost of wrong decisions, particularly if they involve 
an algorithmic bias, may not be symmetrical: false positives and false negatives may have different costs in 
different scenarios. Hence, the measure of biases is important to assess the full cost/benefit analysis of 
choosing appropriate decision aids. 
5.1.2 Presence of an authority/complacency bias 
Model Test H0 H1 P value 
Bernoulli Χ2 homogeneity p1 = p3 p1 ≠ p3 0.001 
Bernoulli Χ2 homogeneity p1 = p4 p1 ≠ p4 0.047 
Bernoulli Fit  p1 = p3 p1 ≠ p3 0.001 
Bernoulli Fit p1 = p4 p1 ≠ p4 0.047 
Bernoulli Χ2 independence Y3, Y4 ind. Y3, Y4 not ind. < 0.001 
Gaussian kernel Delta E[P3 ]= E[P4] E[P3 ]≠ E[P4] < 0.001 
Gaussian kernel Kolmogorov-Smirnov F1 = F3 F1 ≠ F3 < 0.001 
Gaussian kernel Kolmogorov-Smirnov F1 = F4 F1 ≠ F4 0.032 
Table 3: results of the statistical tests. 
All the tests reject the null hypothesis H0 to 5%, only hypothesis p1 = p4 and F1 = F4 require a threshold of 5%, 
for the others, 1% is sufficient. We conclude that the presence of a recommendation, and whether this 
recommendation is right or wrong, affects the rationality of the subjects, and the distribution functions of 
rationality are significantly different in the three cases. 
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- the probability of a rational decision is not the same depending on whether the user is alone, assisted 
by an incorrect recommendation or a correct one 
- the distribution function of the degree of rationality is different for the three conditions. 
- the success rate of subjects with an incorrect recommendation is not in-dependent of the success rate 
of subjects with a correct recommendation. 
5.1.3 Quantification of the authority/complacency bias (econometric model) 
Coefficients β1 and β2 of the two selected models are significantly nonzero at 5%. We can therefore reject the 
hypothesis that displaying a recommendation has no effect on the rationality of subjects. The model provides 
us with a metric that can be used to various groups of the pool of subjects and compare their relative rationality 
(B(αi), 0= little influence) and resistance (C(αi), 1=maximal resistance). 
 
We can apply this model to study trends between different demographic classes recorded at the start of each 
run or presentation variants, between individuals, between trials (passengers) or any other available criteria. 
For instance, we display here the authority bias and resistance by type of studies (Table 4). 
 
Study type Authority bias B(αi) Resistance C(αi) 95% conf. B(αi), 95% conf. C(αi) 
Engineering/science 0.0666 0.8581 [0.0626, 0.0705] [0.8152, 0.9011] 
Business 0.0708 0.8423 [0.0663, 0.0753] [0.7898, 0.8947] 
Humanities 0.0684 0.8471 [0.0641, 0.0726] [0.7970, 0.8971] 
other 0.0737 0.8423 [0.0687, 0.0787] [0.7900, 0.8946] 
 
Age range B(αi) C(αi) Level of study B(αi) C(αi) 
15-25 0.0661 0.8606 2- 0.0688 0.8553 
25-40 0.0687 0.8473 4 0.0681 0.8552 
40-55 0.0663 0.8522 5 0.0657 0.8537 
55+ 0.0713 0.8548 8 0.0694 0.8545 
Table 4: authority bias and resistance for different demographic groups. 
While the bias and resistance differences are small, those measures can be useful to apply to varying levels of 
expertise on a real task. Data and detailed results are available in the supplementary material. 
5.1.4 Comparison between presentation variants 
To choose the most effective presentation mode, depending if our goal is to maximize collaboration 
effectiveness, or to minimize authority bias while maintaining a high collaboration effectiveness, we compare 
the distributions of success under several conditions in Figure 6. 
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Figure 6: comparison of success rates with various stimuli presentations (black marks), success rates with wrong 
recommendation (red marks), success rate with good recommendations (green). Blue marks indicate the success without 
decision aid, and the line represent the “success rate” of the algorithm alone. 
 
In Figure 6, we see success rate in the control condition as a horizontal line of blue marks, as a reference. Also 
for reference, the continuous horizontal line marks the “success rate” of the algorithm taken alone. The black 
marks indicate the success rate of the presentation mode. If the black marks are above both the blue marks 
(human alone) and the line (“computer alone”), then we can say the decision aid is effective in improving 
decision performance. This happens in all conditions but the last one, where the recommender has a much 
higher “success rate” of 80%. Based on this figure, the best performance is achieved with the “Forced 
acknowledgement” presentation mode (the subject must click to see the recommendation, then they can make 
their decision), although other presentations are quite close. This is the same information as tables 1 and 2. 
 
But more importantly, the red marks show the distribution of success with a wrong recommendation. We can 
see that in the “optional display” presentation mode, the authority bias is weaker. This suggests using the 
presentation mode “optional display” over “Forced acknowledgement” if one is particularly concerned about 
avoiding underlying algorithmic biases. 
 
Finally, our econometric model can provide similar measures for various subject groups, allowing to identify 
differences by type of participants (Figure 7). Here we see that the “75” presentation mode consistently induces 
more authority bias, while “Forced acknowledgment” induces less authority bias. The differences between 
groups appear not significant, except the 25-45 age group that seems to have slightly lower resistance. 
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Figure 7: Authority bias by type of studies and presentation mode, and resistance bias by type of studies and presentation 
modes. These graphs show few differences between demographic groups. 
5.1.5 Qualitative feedback 
Time spent on this experiment is not relevant enough to justify elaborate statistics: we needed a task that could 
be completed fast to reach a large population. Aggregated data shows that, by and large, our assumptions hold. 
The average time to answer a trial is 10.3s in the control condition vs. 9.5s in the 1st experiment condition, with 
medians at 6.3s and 5.4s respectively, suggesting a small performance improvement with the decision aid. In 
the experiment condition, there is a slightly longer average time (9.6s vs 9.1s) when the recommendation is 
wrong than when it is correct, suggesting that subjects perceive the need to reflect when presented with a 
counter-intuitive proposition. Performance time by demographic category does not vary much, and finally, the 
time spent on the experiment influences very little the success rate (Figure 8). 
  
Figure 8: 2D plot time spent x success rate. 
Subjects feedback 
Subjects showed a variety of reactions. Some explained their reasoning: "i only looked at sex and class, taking 
more things into account was too confusing", “The pattern is pretty obvious.  First class was a high chance of 
survival.  Female is a high chance of survival.  Children did better than adults.  I didn't trust that the algorithm 
would do better than saying survive for 1st class and female.”.  
Others detailed their frustration at various constraints we had voluntarily set for the task: "I wish the algorithm 
had provided me with some explanation about its recommendations. Typically, when I disagreed with the 
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recommendation, I would have loved to ask "why do you recommend this?"", "If the algorithm is only 80% 
accurate, why show us the algorithm answer before we make our decision?", "I would have needed a few 
explanations on how the algorithm works before the experiment and while doing it some feedback on how it 
decided would have been helpful.", "I would have preferred to answer with probabilities rather than a binary 
choice.", "Very confusing why i have to rate my own success rate but can't pick 50/50. Is the study about 
confidence? I don't recall a question asking my gender, so you may be unable to control for lower confidence 
bias in women...", “I would be interested to know the AI learning method”.  
Finally, many showed an understanding and appreciation for the study, noting that wrong recommendations 
could indeed affect their judgment: "Interesting experiment. Would love to see the end study!", "Funny (not topic, 
itself) and interesting", "AI = Random?", "I am very curious to understand the analyses process and the results. 
Would it be possible to receive the paper when published? Thanks". In debriefing interviews, subjects indicated 
that the test had made them aware of the complexity of the thought process at play when deciding to trust an 
algorithmic recommendation, which indeed, was the primary motivator of this study. 
6 DISCUSSION 
6.1 Limitations 
Our measurements on this task may not be generalizable to other decision tasks. Our results align with [43], 
[24], [54] and [1]. Taken together, they suggest that decision aids are useful only when the “algorithm alone” 
success is within a certain range, which we can roughly estimate as[70%..human success rate + constant]. Still, 
the causes of the uncertainty in a decision-making task may vary widely, the bias patterns may equally vary. 
Our contribution lies in the metrics of collaboration, authority bias and resistance, how to assess them and put 
them in production for our specific context, it is not a contribution to Decision Theory. 
 
The task we have evaluated is not an expert task, it is more comparable to a routine managerial decision than 
to a complex decision such as medical diagnosis. Even though the metrics we have defined can be applied to 
those more complex contexts, experimental setup and access to many experts should make this very difficult, 
justifying more longitudinal approaches such as [12]. As mentioned in the introduction, our focus is in providing 
generic decision aids in the context of business decisions, and our task matches this context. 
 
Finally, the effects we have observed, while statistically significant, may seem quite modest. We have shown a 
significant advantage of augmented decision-making in certain circumstances, and a significant difference in 
several presentation modes to contain, or, on the contrary, increase, authority bias and resistance. These 
modest effects reflect the narrow window in which augmented decision-making has its usefulness. As our results 
suggest, when the algorithm clearly outperforms humans, it is probably better to rethink the role of the human. 
Conversely, when the algorithmic aid is of poor relevance, it is likely not useful, and, on the contrary, may lead 
to unwanted propagation of algorithmic biases through authority or complacency cognitive biases. 
6.2 Performance metrics for augmented decision making  
Our metrics enable the semi-automated introduction of performance measurement in decision support 
interfaces, which are appearing in many business processes. First, a measure of collaboration/decision aid 
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effectiveness enables deciding if a decision support system provides value to the instrumented task, if the 
decision aid may just as well be removed to avoid introducing biases, or, on the contrary, if the task may be 
automated. Next, a measurement of authority bias and resistance based on an econometric model for different 
presentation modes enables refining these measurement to take into account asymmetries in the cost model 
of decision-making. It should be noted that other biases, such as decision fatigue, can be modeled using exactly 
the same tool, provided the evaluated task and data collection methods support this measurement. Initially, we 
wanted to measure this bias, but on a decisions that takes less than 10 seconds, any effect is difficult to exhibit. 
 
Ultimately, a decision support tool performance should be modeled after an equation similar to: 
V = (1-E) Vd – E Cd - Ct 
Where E is the error rate of the decision task, Vd is the value attributed to a correct decision, Cd is the cost of 
making a wrong decision and Ct is the cost of making the decision (typically human time and amortized time to 
develop the decision aid solution). The actual equation in a given situation should be weighted more precisely 
though, depending on various other costs, such as a difference between false positives and false negatives, or 
keeping decisions homogenous rather than maximizing value. Only a careful introduction of the metrics we 
propose can allow such fine-grained assessment of the benefit of decision aids in a particular context. 
6.3 Towards a methodology and embedded measures of performance in augmented decision making 
Our mid term goal is to apply the metrics we have defined to real usage scenarios, in several use cases we 
have identified with customers, such as the decision to start an audit on financial transactions that raise an 
alarm. Another important direction is to apply our methodology to other decision aids, such as nearest-neighbors 
methods, that shows the data and outcomes of cases closely related to the present case. 
In the longer run, we envision that decision aids will be generalized in business decision systems, provided they 
are instrumented with tooling that continuously assesses their relevance and performance so as to mitigate 
risks while improving the productivity and quality of decision-making. 
7 CONCLUSION 
We have presented a set of metrics to include in A/B testing of decision aids used in business decision tasks to 
assess their usefulness and control the biases a particular decision aid and its presentation may induce on the 
decision maker. Applied to a simple decision task, our metrics can be used to show the possibility of human-
system collaboration (72% of success for humans alone, vs 76% for a human assisted by an algorithm that 
gives the correct answer 75% of the time). We have also defined measurements of authority/complacency 
biases and defined a metric of resistance to this bias. Applied to our decision task, we found a significant effect 
of wrong recommendations on the rationality of subjects (-5%), indicating that underlying algorithmic biases in 
the decision aid may be propagated in the decision process instead of compensated by the human. 
 
Testing several presentation variants, we found that a technique that presenting the recommendation only on 
request (optional) was effective in increasing the resistance of the subjects, all the while preserving the 
performance of decision-making.  
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Our measurement system is meant to be embedded in A/B testing of generic decision support system used in 
many contexts of business decision management systems and business processes. Augmented decision 
systems shift part of the responsibilities of the decision maker to the system designer. Introducing systems that 
may induce authority, complacency or other cognitive biases must be avoided. Hence, we believe furthering 
this work is important to shape the future of augmented business decision-making. 
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